Perhaps it is a sign of my age, but it increasingly seems to me like it’s always campaign season. The Republicans, having won the coin toss back in 2024, have elected to defend in 2026 while the Democrats will go on offense. While it is still months away, the Democrats’ apparent strategy for the next election is to defund ICE (since defunding the police worked so well in 2024) and to blame Trump for a bad economy.
The economy is actually pretty good, but accuracy doesn’t matter in election rhetoric and facts never matter as much as the appearance of things, so Trump is trying to make it look like he is working to make things “more affordable.” One of the common complaints is that housing is more expensive, particularly entry level homes for first-time buyers, so the President is adopting an oft-heard solution: forbid large investment entities from buying homes to derive income from rental property.
Every housing debate eventually arrives at the same emotionally satisfying villain: a financial institution, who’s wearing a dark suit and has a darker soul, (and—if we are being honest—sporting a monocle it does not need). (Most Americans learned their basic economics from playing Monopoly, which is a substantial improvement since our parents learned theirs from watching Frank Capra movies.)The theory goes like this: “Big money” is buying homes, turning them into rentals, and therefore driving prices into the stratosphere. So, if we just ban financial institutions (or hedge funds, or private equity, or “people who use spreadsheets”) from purchasing houses, the market will calm down, prices will fall, and a grateful public will frolic through affordable subdivisions like it is 1997 again.
It is a great story with clear heroes, transparent villains, and the kind of moral clarity you only get from a plot that skips the boring parts like math, incentives, and supply and demand. The problem is that this solution—while political catnip—mostly aims at reducing demand, when the durable, boring, unglamorous lever that actually lowers prices is usually increasing supply.
Let’s unpack that, with only mild sarcasm and minimal property damage. First, the housing market is not a morality play. Housing prices are largely a function of something that economists use to ruin parties: supply and demand.
- When demand rises (more people, higher incomes, low interest rates, migration, smaller household sizes), prices go up.
- When supply cannot respond (zoning, permitting delays, labor shortages, infrastructure limits, neighborhood resistance, financing constraints), prices go up more.
Notice something critical: the “can respond” part is doing a lot of work there. If a city or region has strong demand and a system that makes new housing painfully slow, expensive, or legally impossible to build, prices climb whether the buyer is a schoolteacher, a dentist, or a corporation headquartered in Delaware with a logo that looks like a spreadsheet cell.
So, yes, investors can matter at the margin, especially in certain neighborhoods, during certain periods, or in certain housing types. But the bigger, long-run story in most high-cost markets (think every city in California) is that we are not building enough homes, relative to the number of people who want to live in those places.
You can chase villains all day. If the market is short a large number of units, it will behave like a market short a large number of units: it will bid up the existing ones. And it doesn’t matter who is doing the bidding
What happens if you ban financial institutions? Let’s say government passes a law tomorrow: “No financial institutions may buy single-family homes.” The crowd cheers, a bald eagle sheds a tear, and—for two minutes—Bernie Sanders smiles. Then the market reacts, because markets are like that.
Demand doesn’t vanish; it just reroutes. If a certain pool of buyers is blocked, the demand will shift into:
- Smaller investors (LLCs, “mom-and-pop” landlords, partnerships, family offices),
- Buyer proxies (entities structured to skirt definitions),
- Out-of-state individuals, or
- Owner-occupants who were already competing.
You have not eliminated the underlying demand for housing as an asset. You have mainly changed who is allowed to participate, and how they will structure their participation. If the fundamental problem is “too many people chasing too few homes,” rearranging the list of permitted chasers is not a structural fix.
Some policies reduce rental supply (and raise rents). If investors buy homes and rent them out, and you clamp down hard, you can end up with fewer rental options—particularly in places where single-family rentals are a meaningful part of the rental stock. Result: renters compete harder for fewer rentals. Rents rise. Then what happens?
- Renters with resources decide to buy.
- That pushes demand back into the ownership market.
- Prices do not obediently collapse: they reallocate pain.
A policy that makes you feel like you punished the right people can still land the bill on the wrong people.
You will probably make new housing harder to build. Here is the unromantic truth: a lot of housing gets built because someone can finance it, aggregate it, manage it, and operate it at scale. Some institutional money goes into:
- Build-to-rent communities,
- Large multifamily housing, and
- Infill projects that require patient capital and tolerance for bureaucratic misery (building within a city where infrastructure already exists, on a vacant lot, for example).
If you write broad laws that scare away capital—or make compliance a legal minefield—you can reduce construction activity. And reducing construction is an odd strategy for lowering prices in a shortage.
This is the key point: Supply is the pressure valve. Break the valve, and you do not get lower pressure. You get a louder bang.
Demand suppression is the “diet soda” of housing policy. Demand-reduction policies feel satisfying because they look like action, and they create the impression that prices are high because of a particular group’s behavior. Every politician loves a quick solution that fits on a bumper sticker and is a little too complicated for the voter to realize that it doesn’t actually work.
But the demand side is an economic hydra:
- You cut off one head (institutions), and another head pops up (smaller investors).
- You restrict another head (investors overall), and demand returns through household formation, migration, interest rates, and income changes.
In high-demand places, demand is not a tap you can casually turn off—it is a fire hose.
Even if you could suppress demand meaningfully, you run into another awkward truth: people need places to live. Housing demand is not purely optional consumption. You can defer buying, but you cannot defer shelter forever. Which is why, over time, the more reliable approach is to make it easier to build enough homes so that competition among buyers and renters cools down naturally.
Supply is the boring answer that actually works. If you want prices to fall—or at least stop sprinting away from wages—you generally need more of the thing that is expensive. In housing, that means more units, of more types, in more places, at more price points.
No politician is ever going to admit that in a campaign speech. It’s not glamorous and there is no single, obvious villain to defeat. You boost supply by lowering barriers—those obstacles that are usually in place because of another misguided government policy.
If you really want to solve the problem of housing, somewhere in the following list are the actions you need to implement.
Legalize more housing where people want to live. A lot of cities reserve vast areas for only one housing type: detached single-family. That is a policy choice, not a law of nature. Allowing more “missing middle” housing—duplexes, triplexes, fourplexes, courtyard apartments—can add supply without needing to build skyscrapers.
Speed up permitting and stop making lengthy construction time overly expensive. Delays are not just annoying, they are a heavy construction cost, and costs show up in prices. If it takes two years to get approvals, only certain projects pencil out, and only certain developers can survive the wait. Streamlining approvals is not a giveaway to developers—it is a way to reduce the waste, risk, and financing costs that are ultimately baked into what buyers and renters pay.
Reduce parking mandates and other silent cost adders. Mandating excessive amounts of parking can function like a tax on housing (especially in infill areas, where land is expensive). If you require every unit to bring its own slab of asphalt, do not be shocked when the unit costs more.
Build infrastructure that unlocks buildable land. Housing capacity is often constrained by water, sewer, roads, schools, and transit. If you want more homes, you need the pipes and public services to support them.
Encourage accessory dwelling units (ADUs). These are usually a second smaller home on the same lot, sometimes called a mother-in-law’s house or a casita. ADUs are not a silver bullet, but they are a real bullet, and those are rare in policy. They can add incremental supply in established neighborhoods, and they can create gentler options for multigenerational living.
“But investors are buying everything!” Investors are easy to blame because they are visible, and because “BlackRock” sounds more ominous and easier to blame than “the zoning board meeting that ran until 11:00 p.m.” But even if investor activity is inflating prices at the margins, the reason it can do so is usually that supply is tight enough that extra competition moves prices quickly.
In a well-supplied market, investors do not have magical price powers. If they overpay, they lose money. If rents cannot support the purchase price, the model breaks, and they stop buying. Tight supply is the condition that turns marginal buyers into major price movers.
So, if you fix supply, you do not have to win a wrestling match against every possible category of buyer. You just let the market do what markets do when there is enough product: create competition that lowers the price.
If you want a campaign slogan that actually lines up with the economics of the problem, try this: “Build more homes, faster.”
It is not as emotionally satisfying as “ban the villains,” but it has the advantage of being aimed at the lever that actually changes the outcome. Banning financial institutions is, at best, a narrow tool that might modestly affect specific neighborhoods under specific conditions, and, at worst, a policy that shifts demand around, raises rents, or discourages construction.
Meanwhile, increasing supply is the grown-up move: slow, procedural, unsexy, and far more likely to work. The housing market does not care how righteous you feel. It cares how many units exist. And until we build enough of them, the monocle-wearing villain is going to keep showing up in the script—because we wrote the shortage into the plot ourselves.







